Cognitive ontologies: from the bottom up?

Abstract

Cognitive neuroscientists such as Poldrack and Anderson have recently argued that cognitive ontologies - the concepts cognitive scientists use to characterize cognitive processes and the functions of neural areas or networks - should be revised. In his recent book, Michael Anderson has put forward the most radical proposal: Cognitive ontologies should be defined from the bottom up out of the patterns of activation observed in myriad of tasks. This talk examines the prospects of such bottom-up cognitive ontologies.

Bio

Edouard Machery is Professor in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, the incoming Director of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh (starting in 2016), a member of the Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition (University of Pittsburgh-Carnegie Mellon University), and an Adjunct Research Professor in the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. His research focuses on the philosophical issues raised by psychology and cognitive neuroscience with a special interest in concepts, moral psychology, the relevance of evolutionary biology for understanding cognition, modularity, the nature, origins, and ethical significance of prejudiced cognition, the foundation of statistics, and the methods of psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He is also involved in the development of experimental philosophy, having published several noted articles in this field.

The paperback of the anthology Arguing about human nature (Routledge) is now out and can be bought on Amazon, the Routledge website etc.

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